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Contextual fear conditioning takes place if the occurrence of threat cannot be predicted by
specific cues. As a consequence the context becomes the best predictor of the threat and
later induces anxiety (sustained fear response). Previous studies suggest that both the
amygdala and the hippocampus are crucial for contextual fear conditioning. First, we
wanted to further elucidate the neuronal correlates of long-lasting contextual threat within
a highly ecologically setting created in virtual reality (VR). Second, we wanted to distin-
guish between initial and sustained components of the anxiety response to a threatening
situation. Twenty-four participants were guided through two virtual offices for 30s each.
They received unpredictable electric stimuli (unconditioned stimulus, US) in one office
(anxiety context, CXTþ), but never in the second office (safety context, CXT). Successful
contextual fear conditioning was indexed by higher anxiety and enhanced US-expectancy
ratings for CXTþ versus CXT. Initial neural activity was assessed by modeling the onsets
of both contexts, and sustained neural activity by considering the entire context duration
(contrasts: CXTþ > CXT). Amygdala and hippocampus revealed sustained activity. Initial
and sustained activities were found in the middle temporal gyrus, and primary motor
cortex (M1). Additional initial activity was obvious in orbitofrontal (OFC), dorsomedial
(dmPFC), and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). These results suggest that entering a
threatening context initially induces conditioned fear reactions (M1), recall of contingency
awareness (dlPFC), and explicit threat appraisal (dmPFC, OFC). While remaining in the
threatening context might involve anxiety-like conditioned responses (amygdala, M1) and
the generation of a spatial map to predict where and when a threatening event may occur
(hippocampus). We conclude that in humans initial versus sustained anxiety responses
triggered by a threat associated context are associated with distinguishable brain activa-
tion patterns involving a fear network and a “contingency-cognitive” network, respectively.
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.hology, University of Wu¨rzburg, Marcusstrasse 9-11, D-97070 Wu¨rzburg, Germany.
i-wuerzburg.de (M. Andreatta).
rved.
c o r t e x 6 3 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 3 5 2e3 6 3 3531. IntroductionDespite several similarities, fear and anxiety differ in certain
key dimensions (Davis, Walker, Miles, & Grillon, 2010). Fear is
a phasic and specific response prompted by imminent and
real threats, while anxiety is a less specific response alerting
the organism towards a potential and distal threat. Fear be-
gins and terminates rapidly, while anxiety is characterized by
a long-lasting state of apprehension (sustained fear). From a
clinical point of view, panic disorder (PD) or posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) are characterized by a sensitivity to
unpredictable and uncontrollable threats resulting in
enhanced anxiety in very different situations (Grillon et al.,
2009). In other words, symptoms of PD and PTSD seem bet-
ter modeled by sustained fear (Mineka & Oehlberg, 2008).
In the same vein, cued and contextual fear conditioning
reflect the essential features of phasic and sustained fear,
respectively (Davis et al., 2010). In a cue conditioning para-
digm, the conditioned stimulus (CSþ, e.g., a geometrical
shape) reliably signals an aversive unconditioned stimulus
(US, e.g., pain, Pavlov, 1927). Subsequently, individuals show
fear responses to this cue, e.g., potentiated startle responses
(Alvarez, Johnson, & Grillon, 2007; Andreatta, Mu¨hlberger,
Yarali, Gerber, & Pauli, 2010; Glenn, Lieberman, & Hajcak,
2012; Hamm and Weike, 2005) and amygdala activity
(Andreatta et al., 2012; Bu¨chel, Morris, Dolan, & Friston, 1998;
LaBar, Gatenby, Gore, LeDoux, & Phelps, 1998; for a recent
review see Mechias, Etkin, & Kalisch, 2010). In a context con-
ditioning paradigm, the aversive USs are presented while the
individual is within a specific context (CXTþ or anxiety
context, e.g., a room), but such aversive USs are not time-
bounded with a specific cue and the individual is unable to
predict the exact delivery of the USs (Maren, Phan,& Liberzon,
2013; Rudy, 2009). Subsequently, this context elicits anxiety as
reflected in startle potentiation (Grillon, Baas, Cornwell, &
Johnson, 2006; Tr€oger, Ewald, Glotzbach, Pauli, &
Mu¨hlberger, 2012) and amygdala activation (Alvarez, Biggs,
Chen, Pine, & Grillon, 2008; Lang et al., 2009; Marschner,
Kalisch, Vervliet, Vansteenwegen, & Bu¨chel, 2008; Pohlack,
Nees, Ruttorf, Schad, & Flor, 2012). Importantly, the anxiety
triggered by the context differs from the fear elicited by a cue.
In fact, the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (BNST, Alvarez,
Chen, Bodurka, Kaplan, & Grillon, 2011) and the hippocampus
(Alvarez et al., 2011;Marschner et al., 2008; Pohlack et al., 2012)
have been found to be crucial brain structures involved in
contextual fear learning only (for a recent review see Maren
et al., 2013). Specifically, the BNST seems to mediate threat-
monitoring and hyper-vigilance (Davis et al., 2010;
Somerville, Whalen, & Kelley, 2010), while the hippocampus
is important for both spatial and temporal mapping of events
and objects within the context (Pohlack et al., 2012; Rudy,
2009). Supportively, lesions of the BNST disrupted freezing
and the potentiation of the startle responses in a conditioned
context in rats (Luyten, van Kuyck, Vansteenwegen, & Nuttin,
2011), and in humans the BNST was specifically active in a
context where the US was unpredictable (Alvarez et al., 2011).
While most animal studies used spatial contexts, e.g.,
different cages, most previous human studies created
contextual stimuli (CXT) by presenting long-lasting cues(Marschner et al., 2008) or by changing the light color in
the experimental room (Pohlack et al., 2012). These latter CXT
are defined by their temporal characteristics and do not
require any spatial representation. However, in real-life a
context is defined by both temporal and spatial characteris-
tics. Furthermore, context stimuli are characterized by
two kinds of representations (Maren et al., 2013; Rudy, 2009).
On the one hand, organisms establish representation of the
single features of the context (i.e., elemental associative rep-
resentation). On the other hand, the single features are bound
together in order to experience the context as a particular
place or unit (i.e., hierarchical or configural representation).
We use virtual reality (VR) to create ecologically valid
contextsmeeting these criteria (Glotzbach-Schoon et al., 2013;
Tr€oger et al., 2012). Participants are immersed in these
contexts, which they can explore in order to form a spatial
representation. In a VR paradigm it is possible to create
such enriched and diverse situations in a fully controlled
fashion as well as in contingency with observed human re-
sponses thus closely imitating real situations (Sanchez-Vives
& Slater, 2005). In fact, participants may completely immerse
in the virtual world and even forget the real environment,
thus they feel present in the virtual world (defined as pres-
ence). Given a high level of subjective presence, the in-
dividual's responses in the VR are very likely comparable to
real-world behavior. For this reason, VR has been proposed as
an elegant and innovative tool bridging animalmodels to real-
world human behaviors (Huff et al., 2011; Sanchez-Vives &
Slater, 2005).
As mentioned above, the heterogeneous symptomatology
of anxiety disorders has been modeled with cue and contex-
tual fear. The anxiety response induced by a threating context
after contextual fear conditioning very likely is characterized
by both an initial (i.e., at the onset of the context, when
entering) and a sustained (i.e., throughout the visit of the
context) component. There are only few studies in humans
which investigated the neuronal mechanisms underlying
contextual fear learning (Alvarez et al., 2008; Maren et al.,
2013; Marschner et al., 2008; Pohlack et al., 2012) and even
less studies focused on a clear distinction between initial and
sustained responses to the threatening context (Alvarez et al.,
2011; Somerville et al., 2013). We assume that a better un-
derstanding of the brain areas mediating initial versus sus-
tained anxiety induced by contexts would allow a better
understanding of the mechanisms behind anxiety disorders
like PD and PTSD (Mineka&Oehlberg, 2008). Furthermore, this
may allow the development ofmore efficient therapy for these
disorders (Graham & Milad, 2011). Hence, the first goal of this
study was to disentangle the initial and the sustained com-
ponents of the anxiety response to a threatening context by
using an ecological valid technique like VR.
Psychological therapies for anxiety disorders focus on
exposing the patient to the feared object or the feared situa-
tion. Exposure treatment, which can be realized effectively
both in-vivo and VR (e.g., Mu¨hlberger, Weik, Pauli, &
Wiedemann, 2006; Shiban, Pauli, & Mu¨hlberger, 2013), allows
learning a new association between the fear triggering events
and safety. This new learning is called extinction learning and
has been defined as the decrease of defensive conditioned
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aversive event (US) (Herry et al., 2010; Milad & Quirk, 2012).
These newly formed association between the CSþ and no US
inhibits the formerly learned fear response to a stimulus (Milad
&Quirk, 2012). Thus, extinction learningdoesnoterase the fear
memory but the two memories coexist. Such coexistence has
been confirmed by the recovery of conditioned fear responses
by means of change of context (renewal), passage of time
(spontaneous recovery), and re-exposure to the aversive US
(reinstatement) (Bouton, 2004). The context works as occasion
setter,which gates either fear or extinctionmemories (Bouton,
2004; Milad & Quirk, 2012). In line with this view, Kalisch et al.
(2006) found an association between contextual information
and the recall of extinction or fear memory. According to their
findings, the hippocampus processes the context in which the
CSþ is presented, and depending on the information activated
in the hippocampus individuals respond to the CSþ with
greater amygdala (fear memory) or vmPFC (extinction mem-
ory) activation. Such coexistence of fear and extinction mem-
ories can explain relapses after exposure therapies in anxiety
patients (Graham & Milad, 2011). Similar to contextual condi-
tioning, contextual fear extinction is considerably less inves-
tigated in animals (Maren et al., 2013; Milad& Quirk, 2012) and
even less in humans (Lang et al., 2009; Pohlack et al., 2012).
Hence, the second goal of this study was to investigate the
mechanisms underlying extinction learning of contextual fear
in humans.
To test these assumptions, we developed a VR paradigm
where participants learned to associate one virtual office
(CXTþ, i.e., the anxiety context) with the occurrence of aver-
sive events (US, i.e., painful electric shock), but not another
virtual office (CXT, i.e., the safety context). Importantly,
participants could not reliably predict when the delivery of the
US occurred during the CXTþ presentation. In a following
extinction phase, participants learned that the CXTþ was no
longer associated with the aversive US.
During the contextual conditioning phase, we hypothe-
sized greater amygdala as well as hippocampus activation to
the CXTþ as compared to CXT indicating conditioned
anxiety (Lang et al., 2009; Marschner et al., 2008; Pohlack
et al., 2012). In order to disentangle initial and sustained
components of the conditioned anxiety response, we eval-
uated the onset of the context, i.e., when participants
entered the context, to examine the initial anxiety response,
and the enduring context to examine the sustained anxiety
response. We expected amygdala activation especially when
entering (i.e., onset) the CXTþ in line with the results of
Alvarez et al. (2011), while we expected hippocampus acti-
vation throughout the visit of the CXTþ, both as compared to
the CXT. During the extinction phase, we hypothesized
greater activation of the vmPFC to the CXTþ as compared to
CXT.2. Material and methods
2.1. Participants
A total of 30 participants were recruited via advertisements on
a public website. All participants signed the informed consentbefore the experiment, which was approved by the Ethics
Committee of the Medical Faculty of the Julius-Maximilians
University of Wu¨rzburg. All participants were right-handed
and free of any neurological or psychiatric disorders indi-
cated by self-report. Participants received 25 V for their
participation.
For the analysis we considered 24 participants (13 females;
mean age¼ 23.17 years; SD¼ 3.67; range¼ 19e34 years). Three
participants were excluded because they interrupted the
recording, one because the US electrode detached, and two
because they were unaware of contingencies (see 2.3
Procedure).
2.2. Stimulus material
The aversive unconditioned stimulus (US) consisted of an
electric pulse stimulation at 50 Hz lasting 200 msec. The
electric shocks were applied on the left calf via surface bar
electrodes consisting of two durable gold-plated stainless-
steel disks with 9 mm diameter, 30 mm spacing, and an
impedance of 5 U. The electric stimulation was generated by
a constant-current stimulator (Digitmer DS7A, Digitimer
Ltd., Welwyn Garden City, UK) supplying a maximum of
400 V and 10 mA. The intensity of the electric shock was
adjusted individually. The pain threshold procedure con-
sisted of two ascending and descending series. Starting from
0 mA, shock intensity was increased or decreased in .5 mA
steps (Andreatta et al., 2010). Participants evaluated US in-
tensities on a scale ranging from 0 (no pain at all) to 10 (un-
bearable pain). The individual US intensity for the experiment
consisted of the mean value of the four intensities (two from
the ascending series, and two from the descending series)
rated as “just noticeable pain” (i.e., 4) and was increased by
30% to avoid habituation resulting in a mean intensity of
2.86 (SD ¼ 1.78 mA; mean of the subjective painfulness
before conditioning started: 5.13, SD ¼ 1.23).
The VR environments were created with Source Engine
(Valve Corporation, Bellevue, USA) and consisted of two of-
fice rooms which served as CXT. The office rooms had the
same square footage, but differed in their layout (wider
vs longer), floor color (green vs red), window view (village
vs city), and the arrangement of the furniture (see Glotzbach-
Schoon et al., 2013; Tr€oger et al., 2012). The floor colors were
exchanged between the two office rooms and counter
balanced across participants. The two rooms were separated
by a corridor which had a gray floor color and except for a
few pictures on the wall it was empty. In one office room
(CXTþ or anxiety context), participants could receive 0 to 2
USs in an unpredictable manner (see 2.3 Procedure); while in
the other office room (CXT or safety context) no US was
delivered. The assignment of office rooms to conditions
(CXTþ vs CXT) and the order of the office rooms were
counter balanced across participants. The software Cyber-
Session (version 5.3.38), developed in house, served as
controller for the VR. The virtual environments were dis-
played by a Z800 3D Visor head-mounted display (HMD;
eMagin, Hopewell Junction, USA) outside the scanner in our
VR-laboratory and via MRI-compatible goggles (VisuaStim;
Magnetic Resonance Technologies, Northridge, CA, USA) in-
side the scanner.
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The experiment took place on two consecutive days. On Day 1
participants were familiarized with the VR and its equipment
in our VR-lab outside the scanner. On Day 2 they underwent
contextual fear conditioning and extinction in the fMRI
scanner.
Day 1: After the arrival in the laboratory, participants filled
out a socio-demographic questionnaire, the German version
of the Positive And Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, Krohne,
Egloff, Kohmann, & Tausch, 1996) and both the trait and the
state part of the German version of the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory (STAI, Laux, Glanzmann, Schaffner, & Spielberger,
1981). Afterwards, participants were situated into the VR by
means of the HMD and underwent two phases. During Phase
1, participants could freely navigate in the VR with a joystick.
Theywere instructed to explore the two offices for 2min each.
This was realized to allow the formation of a spatial map of
the contexts (O'Keefe & Dostrovsky, 1971). During Phase 2,
participants were guided along a pre-recorded pathway
through each office once for 30 sec each. No aversive US was
delivered. During both phases participant's field of view of the
virtual environments was constantly adapted according to
their head orientation by means of a Patriot electromagnetic
tracking device (Polhemus Corp., Colchester, USA).
Finally, participants rated the anxiety level they had
experienced in the two virtual rooms on a visual analog scale
(VAS) ranging from 0 (no anxiety at all) to 100 (very high anxiety),
and filled out the trait part of the German STAI (Laux et al.,
1981) (M ¼ 39.42, SD ¼ 9.84), German version of the Behav-
ioral Inhibition and Behavioral Activation Scale (BIS-BAS,
Strobel, Beauducel, Debener, & Brocke, 2001) (BIS: M ¼ 2.91,
SD ¼ .56; BAS: M ¼ 3.10, SD ¼ .38), and the German version of
the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI, Alpers and Pauli, 2001)
(M ¼ 17.25, SD ¼ 7.84). Finally, the Igroup Presence Question-
naire (IPQ, Schubert, Friedmann, & Regenbrecht, 2001) was
applied to verify the individuals' capacity to feel present in the
virtual environment (M ¼ 5.37, SD ¼ 10.20).
Day 2: Twenty-four hours later, participants were invited
for fMRI scanning. Before starting the experiment as well as
after the experiment, participants completed the state partFig. 1 e Experimental design. Participants entered two virtual r
furniture disposition and view from the windows. In one room
(aversive US) could have been delivered unpredictably, while in
delivered. The visit of each room lasted 30 sec. Each trial started
screen was black. Room entry starts with the opening of the ro
door. The extinction phase was similar to the conditioning pha
each context was entered 12 times, while during extinction 8 tof the STAI and the PANAS. The pain threshold assessment
was conducted in the scanner as descried above. Afterwards,
participants first underwent an anatomical scan in absence
of any stimulation; second we applied a GRE field mapping in
order to verify the homogeneity of the magnetic field, and
then the experiment started. The experiment consisted of
two phases: the conditioning phase and the extinction
phase. After each phase, participants reported their anxiety
level on the same VAS as described on Day 1 as well as their
contingency awareness on a VAS ranging from 0 (no US
expectation) to 100 (US surely expected). Additionally, partici-
pants were asked to recall in which office the US had been
delivered. The contingency awareness indicates the verbal
ability of participants to indicate CXT-US associations.
Two participants were not able to recall the correct room;
they were considered as unaware and excluded from the
analysis.
During conditioning (Fig. 1) each learning trial had the
following sequence. Participants stood in front of the door of
one office room. As soon as the door opened, theywere guided
through it on pre-recorded paths. There were six different
paths per room, and each path was completed twice per each
room. Participants entered CXTþ and CXT 12 times each and
spent 30 sec in each virtual office (all together the conditioning
phase consisted of 24 trials). Order of CXTþ and CXT visits
were counter balanced across participants. In four out of 12
CXTþ trials, no US was delivered (CXTþunpaired); in four CXTþ
trials one US was delivered, and in the remaining four CXTþ
trials two USs were delivered. The US was randomly and un-
predictably delivered between 8 sec and 23 sec after context
onset. Importantly, the first CXTþ trial was always pairedwith
a US.
During extinction, the trial sequence was the same but no
USwas delivered. Participantswere guided into the two offices
again (CXTþ, CXT). The paths leading through the virtual
rooms were the same as during conditioning, lasting 30 sec
each. Participants entered CXTþ and CXT 8 times each.
The inter-trial interval (ITI), defined as the time between
the exit of one context and the entry of the next one, lasted
10 sec on average (i.e., between 7.5 sec and 12.5 sec) for both
phases.ooms, which differed in the color of the carpet (red, green),
(CXTþ or anxiety context), 0 to 2 painful electric shocks
the other room (CXT¡ or safety context) no shock was
with a 15 sec inter-trial interval (ITI) during which the VR
om's door and ended with leaving the room through this
se, except that no US was delivered. During conditioning,
imes.
2 To this purpose, we additionally modeled the initial and the
sustained neural anxiety responses in the same analysis applying
a mixed block/event-related analysis (Petersen & Dubis, 2012. The
mixed block/event-related design. NeuroImage 62: 1177e1184).
The results after this analysis are in line with those indicated in
the manuscript. For further information, please contact the
authors.
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Brain images were acquired using a 1.5T MR scanner (Avanto
1.5T, Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) with a standard head coil.
The structural-image acquisition consisted of 160 T1-
weighted sagittal magnetization-prepared rapid gradient-
echo imaging (MP-RAGE) 3D MRI sequences (MPRAGE, 1 mm
slice thickness, TR ¼ 2250 msec, TE ¼ 3.93 msec, 8 flip angle,
FOV¼ 250mm,matrix¼ 256 256, voxel size¼ 1 1 1mm).
For functional imaging, a total of 420 volumes for the condi-
tioning phase, and a total of 280 volumes for the extinction
phase were registered using a T*2-weighted gradient echo-
planar imaging sequence (EPI) with 25 axial slices tilted
approx. 30 to the AC-PC line and covering the whole brain
(5 mm slice thickness; 1 mm gap, descending order,
TA¼ 100msec; TE¼ 40msec, TR¼ 2500msec, flip angle¼ 90,
field of view ¼ 240  240 mm, matrix size ¼ 64  64, voxel
size ¼ 3.1  3.1  5 mm). The first eight volumes of each ses-
sion were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration.
2.5. Data reduction and statistical analysis
FMRI datawere analyzed using Statistical Parametric Mapping
(SPM8, Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, Lon-
don, UK) in MatLab R2008b (MathWorks Inc., Sherborn, MA,
USA). Realignment (b-spline interpolation) and slice time
corrections were performed (Ashburner & Friston, 2005). To
allow localization of functional activation on the participants'
structural MRIs, T1-scans were co-registered to each partici-
pant's mean image of the realigned functional images. Co-
registered T1 images were then segmented, and in the next
step, EPI images were spatially normalized into the Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI) space using the normalization
parameters obtained from the segmentation procedure (voxel
size 2 2 2mm3) and spatially smoothed with an 8mm full-
width-half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel. The voxel-
based time series were filtered with a high pass filter
(128 sec time constant).
Conditioning and extinction phases were analyzed sepa-
rately. In order to distinguish initial anxiety responses from
sustained anxiety responses, we separately analyzed the he-
modynamic response for the onset of the two events (event-
related analysis) and for the whole duration of the two con-
texts (30 sec each, block-wise analysis), respectively. Initial
anxiety responses were modeled by convolving stick func-
tions with the canonical hemodynamic response function
(HRF) at the moment of door opening (see also Fig. 1). For the
block-wise analysis of the conditioning phase, we considered
all the CXT trials, but only the CXTþunpaired trials in which no
US was delivered to prevent contamination of the sustained
anxiety response with US-evoked responses. In both the
block-wise and the event-related analyses, the six movement
parameters of the rigid body transformation were introduced
as covariates. For each participant, we computed the
following one-sample t-contrasts separately for the condi-
tioning and the extinction phases: unpairedCXTþ versus
allCXT (sustained) and allCXTþ versus allCXT (initial).
For a priori expected activations, Region of Interest (ROI)
analyses were carried out for amygdala, hippocampus, stria-
tum (caudate and putamen), insula, anterior cingulate cortex(dACC, BA 24), ventromedial PFC (vmPFC, BA 10) using masks
from WFU Pickatlas software (Version 2.4, Wake Forest Uni-
versity, School of Medicine, NC, USA) separately for the two
hemispheres. We expected effects especially in the right
hemisphere since the right amygdala has been reported to be
particularly and more strongly involved in conditioning
involving sensorial aversive stimuli (Mechias et al., 2010;
Phelps, Delgado, Nearine, & LeDoux, 2004). Based on this, we
performed all ROI analyses separately for the left and the right
hemispheres. Because our scanner was not appropriate to
identify small structural differences, no ROI analysis was
carried out for the BNST. For all ROI analyses, a minimum
cluster size of 5 voxels was required (Tabbert, Stark, Kirsch, &
Vaitl, 2006). The statistical threshold for the activation was set
to p < .05 (corrected for family-wise error, FWE). Next, to reveal
extended activations outside the ROIs, a whole brain (WB)
analysis was conducted by setting the statistical threshold for
activation to p < .001 (uncorrected) with a minimum cluster
size of 10 voxels and then corrected with Monte Carlo simu-
lation (the re-sampled cluster size resulted in 55 voxels, which
is equivalent to a whole brain false discovery rate of p ¼ .05,
Slotnick, Moo, Segal, & Hart, 2003).
We further conducted an exploratory finite impulse
response analysis (FIR) to reveal the time course of the brain
activity during the context presentations (30 sec). The fMRI
signal was re-estimated for significantly activated ROIs in the
block-wise analysis (sustained fear) for the contrast
unpairedCXTþ > allCXT during conditioning. Based on the
supra-threshold voxels (p < .05, FWE-corrected, k  5 voxels)
the percent signal change was calculated and then this signal
was extracted using the rfxplot toolbox (Gl€ascher, 2009)
for each repetition time from context onset to context
offset. Given that our goal was to disentangle initial and
sustained anxiety response,2 we additionally verified with
separated ANOVAs for each of the significant cluster whether
the BOLD signal was specifically greater at the context's
onset or throughout the context's visit (see Supplemental
Material).
Lastly, after the block-wise and the event-related analyses
we exported the beta values of the significant clusters for the
respective contrasts CXTþ > CXT and computed Pearson
correlation analyses with the trait version of the STAI (Laux
et al., 1981).
The anxiety and the contingency awareness ratings were
analyzed separately with ANOVAs with the within-subjects
factors context (anxiety, safety) and phase which had three
levels (pre-conditioning, after-conditioning, after-extinction)
for the anxiety ratings and two levels (after-conditioning,
after-extinction) for the contingency ratings.When necessary,
the Greenhouse-Geisser correction (GG-ε) of the degrees of
freedom was applied and the partial h2 values are reported as
c o r t e x 6 3 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 3 5 2e3 6 3 357measures of effect size. The alpha (a) level for all statistical
tests was set to p < .05 (two-tailed).3. Results
3.1. Questionnaires
Analysis reveals a significant change in participants' positive
mood [F(2,40)¼ 6.17, GG-ε¼ .752, p¼ .010, hp2 ¼ .236], but not in
their negative mood [F(2,40) ¼ 2.21, GG-ε ¼ .674, p ¼ .143,
hp
2 ¼ .099] or their momentary anxiety [F(2,40) ¼ .25, p ¼ .777,
hp
2 ¼ .013]. Participants' positive mood do not differed signifi-
cantly from Day 1 (M ¼ 29.57, SD ¼ 5.46) to Day 2 [M ¼ 28.95,
SD ¼ 5.99; t(20) ¼ .73, p ¼ .475], but participants report a
decrease in their positive mood from the beginning to the end
(M ¼ 26.00, SD ¼ 7.48) of the experiment [t(20) ¼ 2.99, p ¼ .007].
3.2. Ratings
3.2.1. Anxiety (Fig. 2)
Analysis reveals a significant main effect of context
[F(1,23) ¼ 27.95, p < .001, hp2 ¼ .549] and phase [F(2,46) ¼ 16.45,Fig. 2 e Anxiety ratings. The lines (with standard errors)
depict the anxiety ratings for the anxiety context (CXTþ,
solid line) and the safety context (CXT¡, dash-dot line),
respectively. On Day 1 (t1) before conditioning both context
elicited similar anxiety levels. After conditioning (t2),
participants reported significant higher anxiety levels in
CXTþ compared to CXT¡, and this difference was still
present after extinction (t3). Notably, participants' anxiety
levels in CXTþ significantly increased from before to after
conditioning and then significantly decreased to after
extinction. ***p < .001, **p < .01.p < .001, hp
2 ¼ .418]. The main effect of context indicates that
the anxiety context induces a general higher level of anxiety
compared to the safety context. Participants' anxiety is
significantly higher after the conditioning phase on Day 2
compared to both the ratings after the familiarization phase
on Day 1 [F(1,23)¼ 33.94, p < .001, hp2 ¼ .596] and those after the
extinction phase on Day 2 [F(1,23) ¼ 5.24, p ¼ .032, hp2 ¼ .185].
Moreover, the anxiety level after the extinction is still higher
than after the familiarization phase on Day 1 [F(1,23) ¼ 10.82,
p ¼ .003, hp2 ¼ .320].
The interaction effect between context and phase turn out
significant [F(2,46)¼ 25.25, GG-ε¼ .8001, p < .001, hp2 ¼ .523], see
Fig. 2. Post-hoc t-tests indicate that before the conditioning
phase on Day 1, the self-reported anxiety level does not differ
between the two rooms [t(23)¼ .07, p¼ .948]. As expected, after
the conditioning phase on Day 2 participants report a signifi-
cantly higher anxiety level in the anxiety context than in the
safety context [t(23) ¼ 7.54, p < .001]. Supportively, partici-
pants' anxiety ratings for the anxiety context significantly
increase from before to after conditioning [t(23) ¼ 7.04,
p < .001], but not for the safety context [t(23) ¼ .62, p ¼ .54].
After extinction participants still report a higher level of
anxiety for the anxiety context compared to the safety context
[t(23) ¼ 2.83, p ¼ .009]. However, their anxiety ratings for the
anxiety context significantly decrease from after conditioning
to after extinction [t(23) ¼ 4.09, p < .001], whereas the anxiety
ratings for the safety context do not change [t(23) ¼ 1.47,
p ¼ .156].
3.2.2. Contingency awareness
Analysis reveals significant main effects of context
[F(1,22) ¼ 119.04, p < .001, hp2 ¼ .844] and phase [F(1,22) ¼ 23.46,
p < .001, hp
2 ¼ .516]. Furthermore, we find a significant inter-
action effect between context and phase [F(1,22) ¼ 27.93,
p < .001, hp
2 ¼ .559]. Follow-up t-tests reveal that after condi-
tioning participants could correctly indicate in which context
the aversive US was delivered. Namely, contingency ratings
are significantly higher for the anxiety context (M ¼ 85.22,
SD¼ 2.80) compared to the safety context [M¼ 13.22, SD¼ 4.78;
t(22) ¼ 12.10, p < .001]. Participants still report after extinction
a higher association between the anxiety context and the US
(M ¼ 37.52, SD¼ 5.32) than between the safety context and the
US [M ¼ 20.96, SD ¼ 5.93; t(22) ¼ 2.50, p ¼ .020]. However,
participants' contingency ratings decrease significantly from
after conditioning to after extinction, but only for the anxiety
context [t(22) ¼ 8.87, p < .001] and not for the safety context
[t(22) ¼ 1.0, p ¼ .329].
3.3. Neural activities
The significant activations for the event-related (initial
response) and the block-wise (sustained response) analyses
are reported in Fig. 3 and Table 1 for the conditioning phase
and in Table 2 for the extinction phase.
3.3.1. Conditioning
The event-related ROI analyses (p < .05, k  5, FWE-corrected)
focusing on initial neural response related to the contexts'
onset (contrast allCXTþ > allCXT) do not reveal significant
activations. The WB analysis (p < .001, uncorrected, k  55,
Fig. 3 e Initial and sustained brain activity during contextual fear conditioning. Initial anxiety responses (upon panel) were
detected at the onset of the anxiety context contrasted to the safety context; sustained anxiety responses (bottom panel)
were revealed as contrasts between the anxiety and the safety contexts throughout the 30 sec of context presentation.
Motor area was activated by both initial and sustained anxiety (left panel). OFC and dlPFC were specifically active at the
onset of the threatening context (upon right panel). Amygdala and hippocampus activities were peculiar for sustained
anxiety responses (right bottom panel).
c o r t e x 6 3 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 3 5 2e3 6 3358after Monte Carlo simulation) reveals increased activation in a
distributed prefrontal network which consisted of orbito-
frontal cortex (OFC; BA 11, 47), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(dlPFC: superior frontal gyrus), dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
(dmPFC: middle temporal gyrus), and primary motor cortex
(M1: precentral gyrus). The reversed contrast
(allCXT > allCXTþ) yields no significant activations. Lastly, no
significant correlation between the above mentioned brain
activities and the anxiety trait is found (ps > .079).
The ROI analyses for the sustained neural response
(contrast unpairedCXTþ > allCXT) indicate enhanced activity in
the right amygdala and the right hippocampus (ps < .05, FWE-
corrected).3 The subsequent FIR analyses confirms that both
the amygdala (Fig. 4) and the hippocampus activations are
higher for CXTþ compared to CXT when analyzed over the
entire context presentation (for further FIR analyses of the
significant clusters see Supplemental Material). Amygdala
(r ¼ .401, p ¼ .052), but not hippocampus (r ¼ .334, p ¼ .111)3 Notably, we also performed an analysis contrasting the 4
unpairedCXTþ trials and the 4 matched CXT trials only which
revealed comparable results. In fact, ROI analysis revealed for
both the amygdala and the hippocampus enhanced activity to the
CXTþ compared to the CXT. While, the WB analyses confirmed
the activation in the right precentral gyrus (BA 3, M1) triggered by
the CXTþ compared to the CTX-, although this cluster did not
survive after Monte Carlo simulation (x ¼ 46, x ¼ 22, z ¼ 60;
k ¼ 16).activation negatively correlates with the participants' trait
anxiety. Extended neural activation (WB analysis, p < .001,
uncorrected, k  55, after Monte Carlo simulation) is found in
the primary motor cortex (M1; precentral gyrus). For the
reversed contrast (allCXT > unpairedCXTþ) we find greater
activation in the left supplementary motor area (SMA).
3.3.2. Extinction
Both the ROI and the WB analyses of initial and sustained
conditioned neural responses reveals no significant activa-
tions for the contrast allCXTþ > allCXT. Sustained activations
for the reversed contrast allCXT > allCXTþ are revealed in the
right frontal network (inferior and middle frontal gyrus; WB:
p < .001, uncorrected, k  55, after Monte Carlo simulation).4. Discussion
This study was designed to investigate the neural mecha-
nisms involved in the acquisition and extinction of initial and
sustained components of the anxiety response triggered by a
threat associated context. Using VR as an ecologically valid
paradigm to implement contextual fear conditioning in a
highly controlled yet nearly realistic setting, participants
learned an association between an aversive event (the US, a
painful electric shock) and a long-lasting stimulus comprised
of visiting a virtual room (the CXTþ or anxiety context).
Table 1 e Coordinates and statistics for the analysis of the conditioning phase.
Contrast Brain structure x y z Z Cluster size p
Initial
allCXTþ > allCXT Middle temporal gyrus L (BA 21) 56 44 4 4.80 287 <.001
Precentral gyrus L (BA 6) 42 4 24 4.38 105 <.001
Superior frontal gyrus L (BA 9) 14 44 36 4.12 222 <.001
OFC L (BA 11, BA 47) 46 34 8 3.83 73 <.001
allCXT > allCXTþ No significant activations
Sustained
unpairedCXTþ > allCXT Precentral gyrus R (BA 3, BA 4) 46 22 60 3.80 192 <.001
*Hippocampus R 18 4 16 3.66 8 .020
*Amygdala R 18 2 16 3.62 14 .007
allCXT > unpairedCXTþ Supplementary motor area L (BA 8) 0 24 54 4.14 94 <.001
Threshold at p  .001 uncorrected for whole brain analysis with a minimum cluster size of k ¼ 55 (after Monte Carlo simulation) unless
asterisked; *p < .05 FWE-corrected for ROI analysis (k ¼ 5); L ¼ left, R ¼ right hemisphere. Coordinates x, y, and z of the peak voxels are given in
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space. BA ¼ Brodmann area. OFC ¼ orbitofrontal cortex.
4 Interestingly, the presence scores of the IPQ significantly and
positively correlated with the differential anxiety ratings (anxiety
ratings in anxiety context e anxiety ratings in safety context)
both after conditioning (r ¼ .451, p ¼ .027) and after extinction
(r ¼ .478, p ¼ .018). These results support the idea that the more
presence the participant reported, the stronger the conditioning
effect was.
c o r t e x 6 3 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 3 5 2e3 6 3 359Importantly, the aversive US was delivered in an uncontrol-
lable and unpredictable manner so that we induced a feeling
of sustained fear (Davis et al., 2010). A second and different
virtual room comprised a safety context (CXT), in which no
US was delivered. Compared to the safety context, the anxiety
context elicited enhanced anxiety as revealed by ratings and
stronger activations in amygdala, hippocampus, primary
motor cortex (M1). These findings clearly suggest that our VR
paradigm successfully induced contextual fear learning. The
amygdala and the hippocampus have been proposed as
crucial brain areas for the acquisition and expression of
conditioned fear responses, not only to a cue (Bu¨chel et al.,
1998; LaBar et al., 1998; Mechias et al., 2010), but also to a
context (Alvarez et al., 2008, 2011; Maren et al., 2013;
Marschner et al., 2008; Pohlack et al., 2012). The activation of
motor areas suggests the intention to behaviorally respond to
the threatening context, which might involve avoidance be-
haviors (Bu¨chel et al., 1998).
The study's goals were to disentangle initial and sustained
components of the conditioned anxiety response and to reveal
a common brain network involved in both initial and sus-
tained anxiety responses. Specifically, the M1 was found to be
activated to both the entry into the threatening context (i.e.,
initial response) and throughout its visit (i.e., sustained
response), while the amygdala and the hippocampus were
strongly active during the long-lasting visit of CXTþ only and
not at its onset. Considering that the amygdala is crucial for
encoding, storing, and retrieving fear memories (Mechias
et al., 2010), these findings suggest that the amygdala is
important for processing sustained fear (Alvarez et al., 2008,
2011; Pohlack et al., 2012). Furthermore, this study is the first
revealing that amygdala activation is negatively correlated
with the participants' trait anxiety, i.e., the more anxious the
participant, the less discriminative activation between CXTþ
and CXT was found. Interestingly this result is in line with
previous studies, which suggested that anxiety patients are
less able to distinguish between threat and safety (Lissek et al.,
2005; Mineka & Oehlberg, 2008). Notably, the missing initial
amygdala activation in response to the CXTþ onset does not
exclude its crucial role in coordinating initial anxiety
response. In fact, in the classical cue conditioning literature
amygdala activation is sometimes found at CSþ onset (Bu¨chelet al., 1998; LaBar et al., 1998; Marschner et al., 2008), but
sometimes not (Knight, Cheng, Smith, Stein, & Helmstetter,
2004; Merz, Hermann, Stark, & Wolf, 2013). Possibly, this
inconsistency might be due to differences in signal-to-noise
ratio or to methodological differences between studies.
In our study, participantswere immersed in the VRwithout
seeing the real experimental room or the scanner while the
actual experiment was going on. It is possible that they might
have been “present” in the virtual rooms and somehow forgot
the external real room4 (Riva et al., 2007; Sanchez-Vives &
Slater, 2005). In contrast, previous studies have used fluctua-
tion of colors lasting several seconds (Pohlack et al., 2012) or
presented the rooms on a computer screen (Alvarez et al.,
2008, 2011). Hence, in these cases participants could see the
real experimental room for the whole duration of the experi-
ment and consequently they could not experience complete
immersion or full presence in the experimentally varied
contexts. As previous studies proposed (Huff et al., 2011;
Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2005), presence may be a function of
consciousness within the VR. Consequently, the more pres-
ence the individual feels, the more realistic or reality-
connected its reactions are. Therefore, it is tempting to
interpret the brain activations triggered by the virtual con-
texts, especially those we observed in the motor areas, as
correlates of fear behavior, which might reflect a reality-
related response. Thus, immersion into a threatening virtual
context, as realized in this study, might be a promising and
reliably tool for studying real-world context effects. Although
participants reported presence in the VR, we have to
acknowledge that playing back a VR path as realized in the
present study is like watching a movie from the first person
perspective. Therefore, we cannot be sure whether our results
can be generalized to real VR environment allowing partici-
pants to freely move within the virtual rooms. Unfortunately,
Table 2 e Coordinates and statistics for the analysis of the extinction phase.
Contrast Brain structure x y z Z Cluster size p
Initial
CXTþ > CXT No significant activations
CXT > CXTþ No significant activation
Sustained
CXTþ > CXT No significant activations
CXT > CXTþ Inferior frontal gyrus R 34 28 24 4.23 97 <.001
Middle frontal gyrus R (BA 6,8) 34 6 56 3.95 71 <.001
Threshold at p  .001 uncorrected for whole brain analysis with a minimum cluster size of k ¼ 55 unless asterisked (after Monte Carlo simu-
lation); L ¼ left, R ¼ right hemisphere. Coordinates x, y, and z of the peak voxels are given in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space.
BA ¼ Brodmann area. ACC ¼ anterior cingulate cortex. vmPFC ¼ ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
c o r t e x 6 3 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 3 5 2e3 6 3360this is very complicated to realize in the scanner environment
due to movement restrictions.
Despite participants were not free to move in the virtual
world during conditioning, the opening of the virtual door
may have been the moment when they realized whether they
were about to enter the threat or the safety context. Suppor-
tively, all participants included in our analysis were aware
and could correctly report the association between the CXTþ
and the US. Additionally, the view of the threatening context
might have induced distress as the anxiety ratings indicate,
and the individuals might have looked for the most appro-
priate reaction, which is avoidance. We think that the
observed activity in M1 very likely reflects avoidance-like re-
sponses. Our participants learned that they could not activelyFig. 4 e FIR of the right amygdala during context presentations (
sustained activation (on the y-axis, % signal change) in the amy
axis) of the anxiety context (solid line) and the safety context (d
activation in response to the CXTþ than to CXT¡, and importa
threatening context.avoid entering the threatening context, and this might have
determined a greater desire to avoid this context. This
conclusion is supported by a previous study of us in which we
asked participants to enter one out of three virtual rooms
again (CXTþ, CXT and a novel context) after contextual fear
conditioning. In one condition, participants could actively
enter (or avoid) the room by means of a joystick, whereas in
the other condition they choose the room and then they were
passively guided into it. Participants showed stronger avoid-
ance responses, i.e., more participants avoided the anxiety
context, when theywere passively guided into the threatening
context as compared to when they could actively enter the
contexts (Glotzbach, Ewald, Andreatta, Pauli, & Mu¨hlberger,
2012). Notably, M1 activation is commonly reported in30 sec ± 2.5 sec). The lines (with standard errors) depict the
gdala during conditioning throughout the 30 sec (on the x-
ash-dot line), respectively. Amygdala showed greater
ntly this activation was evident throughout the visit of the
c o r t e x 6 3 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 3 5 2e3 6 3 361studies using discrete stimuli signaling threats (i.e., the clas-
sical cue fear conditioning, Bu¨chel et al., 1998; Tabbert et al.,
2006) suggesting that the onset of a threatening context
might work as a cue signaling a potentially dangerous situa-
tion. Sincewe observed these responses also during the whole
visit of the threatening room, it seems possible that partici-
pants have felt a strong and continuous desire to leave the
threatening room throughout their visit. Hence, the forced
stay in a threatening situation together with the strong desire
to get away from this distressing situation might have deter-
mined the activation of amygdala and M1, respectively.
Notably, the involvement of themotor cortex is often reported
in associative aversive learning (Bu¨chel et al., 1998; Mechias
et al., 2010; Tabbert et al., 2006), but it is likewise put to the
background (Butler et al., 2007). From a clinical point of view, it
would be interesting to verify participants' neural and
behavioral responses if they would have the possibility to
freely avoid the threatening room. In fact, the possibility to
avoid a threatening situation induces a feeling of relief and
consequently this positive feeling works as a negative rein-
forcer (Kim, Shimojo, & ODoherty, 2006; Mowrer, 1951, 1956).
As suggested above, our VR setting might have promoted
responses to the threatening situation that are closer to real-
life in comparison to experimental settings in previous
studies. Our findings revealed specific brain areas with sus-
tained activation to the long-lasting context suggesting coor-
dinated neural activity and presumably learning throughout
the threatening situation. Notably, this is highly similar to
real-life situations when individuals experience traumatic
events. For instance, traumatic events during a war typically
last from several minutes to hours. Notably, the development
of PTSD following such trauma (for a recent review about
PTSD see Jovanovic & Norrholm, 2011) has been linked to
altered learning and memory processes (Parsons & Ressler,
2013; Trezza & Campolongo, 2013). Although aversive clas-
sical conditioning has been proposed as a biomarker for
anxiety disorders (Mineka&Oehlberg, 2008) and patients with
anxiety disorders, in particular PTSD, seem to be specifically
sensitive to threat (Jovanovic et al., 2010), we still may
consider that sustained amygdala activationmight also play a
role in other disorders such asmajor depression (MDD) (Siegle,
Steinhauer, Thase, Stenger, & Carter, 2002).
The observed sustained hippocampal activation to the
anxiety context confirms and extends previous studies in
animals (Kim & Fanselow, 1992; Rudy, 2009) and humans
(Alvarez et al., 2008, 2011; Lang et al., 2009; Marschner et al.,
2008; Pohlack et al., 2012). During contextual fear learning it
is of crucial importance to form a temporal trace (Knight et al.,
2004; Marschner et al., 2008) as well as a spatial (Maguire et al.,
1998; O'Keefe & Dostrovsky, 1971) and a configural (Fanselow,
2009; Rudy, 2009) map of the context. These three aspects are
crucial for associating the aversive US with a complex and
long-lasting stimulus such as a context. The spatial map re-
fers to spatial organization of a context (O'Keefe&Dostrovsky,
1971), the configural map refers to a representation of the
context as a whole entity formed by its single components
(e.g., single objects of the furniture in the virtual office, Rudy,
2009), and the temporal trace refers to the temporal repre-
sentation of the (long-lasting) context (Eichenbaum, 2013).
Because of the lack of specific and defined cues signaling theaversive US, tracking one's location in a given context and
memorizing the temporal gap between the painful eventsmay
be the only way to experience some control in foreseeing the
US. The hippocampus seems to process the context as a uni-
tary element and may crucial for associating the complete
context with the aversive USs.
Additionally, we found activation in prefrontal regions (i.e.,
dlPFC and OFC) in response to CXTþ onset (for the specificity
of dlPFC and OFC in initial anxiety processing see
Supplemental Material). According to the dual-system theory
proposed by Rudy (2009), a context requires two kinds of
processing. On the one hand, a representation of the context
as coherent unit is necessary, which is supported by activa-
tion in the hippocampal formation as reported above. On the
other hand, a representation of the single components of that
particular context is necessary. Most likely, this processing is
located in the PFC. Possibly, the context is experienced as
a unitary stimulus when the individuals are guided through
the virtual rooms, probably related to hippocampal repre-
sentation of the above mentioned maps. In contrast, the
moment of entering a context may represent a distinct event
involving some sort of binding which implies prefrontal acti-
vation. Specifically, the dlPFC has been associated with
working memory processes including binding (Baddeley,
2003). Furthermore, the OFC has been implicated in
outcome-expectancy determining flexible behaviors
(Schoenbaum, Roesch, Stanaker, & Takahashi, 2009). There-
fore, it is conceivable that the objects in one room were
momentarily maintained in working memory in order to be
bound with each other and processed as unitary stimulus.
Contemporaneously, while entering the threatening room
participants recognized it as the aversive context and ex-
pected the painful electric shock. Respectively, the binding of
the objectsmight be provided by the dlPFC and the expectancy
of the US might be provided by the OFC.
This study also investigate the brain responses underlying
extinction learning of contextual fear in humans. Surpris-
ingly, we did not find significant initial or sustained activation
to the CXTþ as referred to the CXT during extinction. Un-
expectedly, we found prefrontal activation in response to the
safety context (CXT) as compared to the anxiety context
(CXTþ) during extinction. Interestingly, several previous
studies also reported greater activations to the safety cue
(CS) as compared to the threat cue (CSþ) (Merz et al., 2013;
Phelps et al., 2004), but none of these studies have discussed
these findings. A plausible explanation may be that during
extinction the conditioned stimulus (CSþ or CXTþ) is pre-
sented without the US and this leads to new inhibitory
learning. In our study, we did not mention to our participants
any change of contingencies from one phase (i.e., the condi-
tioning) to the next one (i.e., the extinction). It is therefore
possible that participants still believed that they would
receive the painful shock in the extinction phase as well.
Hence, theymight have started thinking that the USwill come
in the other room, i.e., the safety context. This seems to be in
line with the sustained activation that we found in the pre-
frontal areas during the visit of the safety room. Supporting
this speculation, we observed that contingency ratings for the
CXT slightly increased after extinction, although this dif-
ference did not reach the significance level.
c o r t e x 6 3 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 3 5 2e3 6 3362In summary, we found distinguishable patterns of activa-
tion for the initial and the sustained component of an anxiety
response in humans involving a fear network (i.e., amygdala,
hippocampus and M1) and a “contingency-cognitive” network
(i.e., dlPFC and OFC), respectively. However, we could not find
clear evidence for brain areas involved in extinction of
contextual fear. The VR paradigm we used proved to be a
promising methodological approach as it reflects several as-
pects of real contexts and behavior in contexts. Our results are
an important step in understanding the mechanisms of
learning and changing contextual fear, which might become
helpful in planning more efficient and effective therapeutic
approaches.Conflict of interests
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